[p. 58]
|58| acknowledged beforehand and that they are relieved of the proof of the being of their content. In arithmetic numbers, in geometry space, in medicine human bodies, illnesses are granted from the outset, and they are not expected to prove that there is, e.g., a space, bodies, illnesses. Philosophy in general therefore seemingly has the disadvantage of having to secure a being for its objects before it begins; if it is perhaps allowed to pass that there is a world, it is on the other hand at once challenged if it wanted likewise to presuppose the actuality of the incorporeal in general, of a thinking and a spirit free from matter, still more of God. But the object of philosophy is also not of that kind, and is not supposed to be, that it should only be presupposed. Philosophy, and more precisely the philosophy of religion, would thus first have to prove its object and work towards proving, before it exists, that it is; it would have to prove its existence before its existence.
These, then, would be the preliminary questions which, as it seems, would have to be settled beforehand, and only in whose settlement would the possibility of a philosophy of religion lie. But if such points of view count, philosophy of religion is immediately impossible, since in order to show its possibility those obstacles would first have to be removed. So it seems at first sight. We leave them aside, however; why we do this is to be mentioned briefly in its main moments, in order to remove this difficulty.
The first demand is that one should first investigate reason, the faculty of cognition, before going on to cognizing. Cognizing is then represented as if it happened by means of an instrument with which one wants to take hold of truth. Considered more closely, however, the demand first to know this instrument is clumsy. The critique of the faculty of cognition is a position of the Kantian philosophy,
