[p. 53]
|53| for spirit, and indeed not only in an external, contingent way; rather it is spirit only insofar as it is for spirit; this makes up the concept of spirit itself. Or, to express it more theologically, God is essentially spirit insofar as he is in his community. It has been said that the world, the sensuous universe, must have spectators and be for spirit, – so God must be for spirit much more still.
The consideration can thus not be one-sided, merely a consideration of the subject according to its finitude, according to its contingent life, but insofar as it has the infinite, absolute object as its content. For if the subject is considered for itself, it is considered in finite knowing, in the knowing of the finite. Likewise, when it is asserted on the other side that God is not to be considered for himself, that one knows of God only in relation to consciousness, – then the unity and inseparability of both determinations, of the knowing of God and of self-consciousness, itself presupposes what is expressed in identity, and precisely in it the feared identity is contained.
In fact we thus see the basic philosophical concept present as a general element in the culture of the age, and it is shown here too how philosophy does not stand above its time in such a form that it would be something absolutely different from its general determinacy; rather one spirit goes through actuality and through philosophical thinking, except that this thinking is the true self-understanding of the actual. Or it is one movement by which the age and its philosophy are borne. The difference is only that the determinacy of the age still appears as present contingently, is not justified, and so can still stand in an unreconciled, hostile relationship to truly essential substance, whereas philosophy, as the justification of the principle, is also the universal pacification and reconciliation. As the Lutheran Reformation led faith back to the first
