[p. 52]
|52| hear only of religion, do not find investigations into what the nature of God, God in himself, is, how the nature of God must be determined. God as such is not himself made the object; knowing does not spread itself out within this object and does not point out distinguished determinations in it, so that he himself would be grasped as the relationship of these determinations and as relationship within himself. God is not before us as an object of cognition, but only our relation to God, our relationship to him; and while the expositions of the nature of God have become fewer and fewer, now it is only demanded that man should have religion, stay with religion, and that there should be no progress to a divine content.
c) But if we take out what lies in the proposition of immediate knowing, what is immediately said with it, then precisely God is expressed in relation to consciousness, such that this relation is something inseparable, or that we must consider both. Thereby, first, the essential difference that the concept of religion contains – on the one side subjective consciousness and on the other God as object in himself – is acknowledged. At the same time, however, it is said that there is an essential relation between the two, and that it is this inseparable relation of religion that matters, not what one opines about God, what notions one has.
What this assertion contains as its proper true kernel is the philosophical Idea itself, except that this is held back by immediate knowing in a restriction that is dissolved by philosophy and shown in its one-sidedness and untruth. According to the philosophical concept God is spirit, concrete; and if we ask more precisely what spirit is, the basic concept of spirit is the one whose development is the whole doctrine of religion. Provisionally we can say that spirit is this: to manifest itself, to be for spirit. Spirit is
