Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Introduction

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But although for ordinary consciousness too religion is already the elevation above the finite, it nevertheless happens against this basic determination, when people speak against philosophy in general and in particular against philosophy about God, about religion, that for the purpose of this polemical speaking finite thoughts, relationships of restrictedness, categories and forms of the finite are brought in. From such forms of the finite opposition is made against philosophy, especially against the highest philosophy, the philosophy of religion.

We want to touch on this only briefly. Such a finite form is, e.g., immediacy of knowing, fact of consciousness; such categories are the oppositions of finite and infinite, subject and object. But these oppositions – finite or infinite, subject or object – are abstract forms that are not in their place in this absolutely rich concrete content which religion is. In the spirit, the mind that has to do with religion, quite other determinations are rather present than finitude and so on, and yet what is supposed to matter in religion is made to rest on such determinations. They must admittedly occur, since they are moments of the essential relationship that underlies religion, but the main thing is that their nature must have been investigated and known long before: this first, logical cognition must lie behind us when we deal with religion scientifically; with such categories one must long since have finished. But what is usual is that one rises up from them against the concept, the Idea, rational cognition. Those categories are used without any critique, in a wholly naive way, just as if not even the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason existed, which at least contested these forms and, in its way, had the result that through these categories one can know only appearances. And

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