[p. 19]
|19| all the things that make up the content of his knowledge, which he takes possession of and uses as means for his ends, as well as he himself, spirit and the spiritual faculties which, as he says, he makes use of in order to arrive at that cognition.
But this concession is cold and dead, because in it what makes up the liveliness of this consciousness, where it is with itself and is self-consciousness, this insight and cognition, is lacking here. Everything determinate rather falls into the sphere of cognition and of human, self-posited ends, and here only the own activity of self-consciousness is present. So that concession too is now unfruitful, because it stops at the abstract universal, namely at this, that everything is a work of God; and with the most diverse objects (course of the stars and its laws, ant, man) that relation stops at one and the same thing, that God made it. Since this religious relation of the single objects always sounds the same and is monotonous, it would become boring and burdensome if it were repeated with each single thing. One therefore settles the matter with the one concession that God made everything, thereby satisfies this religious side once and for all, and in the course of cognition and the pursuit of ends it is then no longer thought of. That concession can then seem to have been made only in order to be rid of it, perhaps also in order to be covered, as it were, on this side as towards the outside; in short, one may be in earnest about it or not.
Piety does not grudge the effort of raising its gaze to God in each and every thing, even though it does so daily and hourly in the same way. But as pious sensation it stands altogether in singularity; it is in each moment wholly what it is, and without reflection and comparing consciousness. Here, on the other hand, where cognition and self-determination count, this comparing
