[p. 38]
|38|
α) For by that rational consideration of religion, which was only abstract metaphysics of the understanding, God was grasped as an abstraction, which is empty ideality and which the finite confronts externally; and so on this standpoint too morality, as a particular science, made up the knowledge of what fell on the side of the actual subject with regard to acting and conduct. The side of man’s relation to God stood separated for itself. Thinking reason, on the other hand, which no longer keeps itself abstract, but starts from man’s faith in the dignity of his spirit and is driven by the courage of truth and freedom, grasps the truth as something concrete, as fullness of content, as ideality in which determinacy, the finite, is contained as a moment. God is therefore not the empty for it, but spirit; and this determination of spirit does not remain for it only a word or a superficial determination; rather the nature of spirit develops for it in that it recognizes God essentially as the triune God. Thus God is grasped as making himself the object of himself, and then the object in this distinction remains identical with God; God loves himself in it. Without this determination of the Trinity God would not be spirit and spirit an empty word. But if God is grasped as spirit, this concept includes the subjective side within itself or develops itself into it, and the philosophy of religion, as thinking consideration of religion, encompasses the entire determinate content of religion.
β) As regards, however, that form of thinking consideration which holds to the word of Holy Scripture and claims to explain it with reason, the philosophy of religion stands only seemingly on common ground with it as well. For that consideration, by its own sovereign authority, lays its argumentations at the basis of Christian doctrine, and even if it still lets the biblical words stand, particular opinion nevertheless remains the
