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I. The Universal Concept of Religion
The first is the concept in its universality, which is followed only as the second by the determinacy of the concept, the concept in its determinate forms; these are necessarily connected with the concept itself. In the philosophical mode of consideration it is not the case that the universal, the concept, is put at the front, as it were, for honour’s sake. Elsewhere concepts of right, of nature, are universal determinations that are put at the front and with which one is really in embarrassment; but one does not take them seriously either and then has the representation that they do not matter, but the content proper, the single chapters, does. The so-called concept has no further influence on this further content than merely to indicate roughly the ground on which one finds oneself with these materials, and to prevent one from drawing content from another ground; the content, e.g. magnetism, electricity, counts as the matter, the concept as the formal. In such a mode of consideration, however, the concept put first, e.g. right, can also become a mere name for the most abstract, most contingent content.
In philosophical consideration too the beginning is the concept; but it is the content itself, the absolute matter, the substance, as is, e.g., the germ from which the whole tree develops. In it all determinations are contained, the whole nature of the tree, the kind of its sap, its branching, but not preformed in such a way that, if one took a microscope, one would see the branches, leaves in miniature, but in a spiritual way. Thus the concept contains the whole nature of the object, and cognition itself is nothing but the development of the concept, of what is contained in itself in the concept, has not yet entered existence, been explicated, laid out. So we begin with the concept of religion.
