[p. 41]
|41| different from his work which he has produced in religion. The more man in rational thinking lets the matter itself hold sway in him, renounces his particularity, relates himself as universal consciousness, the less his reason seeks its own in the sense of something particular, the less will it fall into that opposition; for it, reason, is itself the matter, spirit, the divine spirit. The church or the theologians may disdain this succour or take it amiss when their doctrine is made rational; they can even reject with proud irony the efforts of philosophy, when these are not directed with hostility against religion but rather want to fathom its truth, and mock the “made” truth. But this disdain no longer helps and is vanity once the need of cognition and its discord with religion has awakened. Then insight has its rights, which can in no way be refused any longer, and the triumph of cognition is the reconciliation of the opposition.
Although philosophy as philosophy of religion distinguishes itself so much from the tendencies of the understanding that are at bottom hostile to religion and is by no means so ghostlike a thing as it is usually represented to be, we nevertheless still today see the strongest opposition of philosophy and religion set up as the shibboleth of the age. All the principles of religious consciousness that have developed at present – however much their forms may differ from one another – agree in this, that they are hostile to philosophy, seek in any case to keep it from occupying itself with religion; and so it is still our business to consider philosophy in its relationship to these principles of the age. We have all the more reason to promise ourselves success from this consideration because it will turn out that, for all that hostility to philosophy, though it may come from ever so many sides, indeed from almost all sides of present consciousness, the time has nevertheless now
