[p. 62]
|62| in religion one is surely dealing not with appearances, but with absolute content. But the Kantian philosophy seems to have been there for that argumentation only so that one might proceed all the more unabashedly with those categories.
It is wholly inappropriate, indeed absurd, to bring up these categories, such as immediacy, facts of consciousness, against philosophy and to tell it that the infinite is different from the finite, the object from the subject, as if any human being, any philosopher, had not known that or had first to learn such a triviality. Nevertheless people are not ashamed to bring up such cleverness triumphantly, as if they had thereby made a new discovery.
We remark here only this, that such determinations as finite and infinite, subject and object are admittedly – which always makes up the basis of that so clever and over-wise talk – different, but also at the same time inseparable. We have the example of this in physics at the north and south pole of the magnet. So it is also said: those determinations are as different as heaven and earth. That is correct; they are absolutely different, but, as the image brought forward already indicates, inseparable: one cannot point to earth without heaven and conversely.
It is hard to engage with those who contend against the philosophy of religion and think they triumph over it; for they say quite bluntly that immediacy is after all something other than mediation, but in doing so show too great an ignorance, complete unfamiliarity with the forms and categories in which they make their attacks and pass judgement on philosophy. They give assurances quite naively, without having reflected on these objects or having looked thoroughly in external nature and in the inner experience of their consciousness, their spirit, to see how these determinations occur there. Actuality is not present to them, but alien and
