[p. 22]
|22| the preservation of life and of the interests connected with existence, which are furthered at one time, are just as much endangered and destroyed at another. Thus there lies a division within itself in the fact that, contrary to God’s eternal mode of working, finite things are raised to essential ends. The representation of God that he and his mode of working are universal and necessary is contradicted by that inconsistency, and it even destroys that universal determination.
If piety, then, considered the external ends and the externality of the matter according to which it is useful for something other, the natural determinacy from which one starts does indeed seem to be only for something other. But this, considered more closely, is its own relation, its own nature, the immanent nature of what is related, its necessity. So for piety the actual transition is made to the other side, which was earlier designated as the moment of the selfhood.
β) Piety is therefore thrown out of its argumentation, and once a beginning has been made with thinking and relationships of thought, thinking must above all demand and seek [what] is its own, namely first consistency and necessity, and set these against that standpoint of the contingent. With this the principle of selfhood at the same time fully develops. I, as simple, universal, as thinking, am relation in general; since I am for myself, self-consciousness, the relations are also supposed to be for me. To the thoughts, representations that I make my own, I give the determination that I myself am. I am this simple point, and what is for me I want to know in this unity.
Cognition to that extent goes towards what is and towards its necessity, and grasps this in the relationship of cause and effect, ground and consequence, force and its expression, of the universal of the genus as against the single
