[p. 48]
|48| origin and appearance; at the question what conviction one has oneself, one is astonished.
The absolute mode of origin from the depth of spirit, and thus the necessity, truth of these doctrines, which they also have for our spirit, is pushed aside in the historical treatment: it is occupied with these doctrines with much zeal and learning, but not with the content, but with the externality of the disputes about them and with the passions that have attached themselves to this external mode of origin. There theology is placed low enough by itself. If the cognition of religion is grasped only historically, we must regard the theologians who have brought it to this conception as clerks in a trading house, who keep books and accounts only of others’ wealth, who act only for others without getting any property of their own; they do receive a salary, but their merit is only to serve and to register what is the property of others. Such theology is no longer at all in the field of thought; it no longer has to do with infinite thought in and for itself, but with it only as a finite fact, opinion, representation and so on. History occupies itself with truths that were truths, namely for others, not with such as would be the property of those who occupy themselves with them. With the true content, with the cognition of God, those theologians have nothing to do at all. As little as the blind man sees the painting, even if he feels the frame, so little do they know of God. They only know how a certain dogma was laid down by this or that council, what reasons the members of such a council had for it, how this or that view came to dominate. One is always dealing with religion here, and yet it is not religion itself that comes into consideration. They tell us much about the history of the painter of a painting, about the fate of the painting itself, what price it had at different times,
