[p. 299]
|299| self-determination, self-activity. What is servitude towards a law?
α) in what is opposed – will-lessness;
β) in relation to other men – lack of feeling, lack of beautiful relations, love, separation
γ) godlessness
b) The lord, the invisible lord – opposed to him fatelessness, either of innocence or of self-power; the former not possible, he could not unite the two opposites in them, because really only one of the opposites ruled without conflict, – the latter not, as godlessness – thus rule softened into fatherhood – dependence on a loving one as regards need.
c) Others determined α) either by me – opposed to this, morality, or β) by another (contempt for men, egoism and hope in objective help) – respect for others, correction or annihilation of this hope.
Authority against authority – solely on the authority of faith in human nature. John: he knew what power was in man. Miracles – he also hoped for their effect – something real, not polemical. The stirring up of the subjective in many respects – to found a beautiful religion, the ideal of it? does one find it?
Only when morality is vindicated can a distinction be made between ceremonial and moral laws; in the Jewish religion morality impossible, because there was no freedom in it, but thoroughgoing rule.
In general [Jesus set the] subject against the law.
Did he oppose morality to the law? – Morality according to Kant is the subjugation of the individual under the universal, the victory of the universal over the individual opposed to it – rather elevation of the individual to the universal, union – sublation of the two opposites through union.
a) Oneness in the determinate presupposes freedom, for something restricted has an opposite12)
12) Hegel’s footnote. And oneness itself [is] in this way a restricted one – not the unity of the understanding, which is also an incomplete oneness; through the unity of the understanding the separated are left as separated, the substances remain separated; the union is objective; in the oneness of will the separated are no substances; of the opposites one is wholly excluded; the other is chosen, i.e. a union of the representation and of the one representing takes place; the one representing and what is represented become one; this is action; the moral element of the action is in the choice; the union in the choice is that what is excluded is something separating; that what is represented, which in the action is united with the one representing the activity, should itself already be something united; immoral if it is something separating. The possibility of opposition is freedom – opposing itself an act of freedom.
The moral action is therefore incomplete and imperfect because it presupposes choice, because it presupposes freedom, opposites, exclusion of one opposite, – the more connected this excluded thing is, the greater the sacrifice, the separation, the unhappier the fate; [the] greater this individual, the more torn the Idea of man; [the] more intense his life, the more it loses in extension, and the more he separates himself again. Morality [is] conformity, union with the law of life; but if this law is not the law of life, but itself something alien, then there is the highest separation; objectivity.
