[p. 340]
|340| for insofar as the others too were to suffer the punishment in him, he is the universal, their concept, and the law, as commanding or as punishing, is law only by being opposed to something particular. The law has the condition of its universality in the fact that the acting men or the actions are particular; and the actions are particular insofar as they are considered in relation to universality, to the laws, as conforming to them or contrary to them; and in this respect their relationship, their determinacy, can suffer no change; they are actual, they are what they are; what has happened cannot be made not to have happened, punishment follows the deed; their connection cannot be torn; if there is no way of making an action not to have happened, if its actuality is eternal, then no reconciliation is possible, not even through suffering the punishment; the law is indeed satisfied by this, for the contradiction between its pronounced ought and the actuality of the criminal, the exception the criminal wanted to make from universality, is sublated. But the criminal is not reconciled with the law (whether this be for the criminal an alien being or subjectively in him, as bad conscience); in the former case the alien power that the criminal has created and armed against himself, this hostile being, ceases to act on him once it has punished; when it has reacted on him in just the way the criminal acted, it does desist, but withdraws into its threatening position, and its shape has not vanished or been made friendly; on the bad conscience, the consciousness of a bad action, of oneself as someone bad, the punishment suffered changes nothing; for the criminal always beholds himself as a criminal, he has no power over his action as an actuality, and this actuality of his is in contradiction with his consciousness of the law.
