[p. 323]
|323| that what is legal is something universal and its whole obligation lies in its universality, because on the one hand every ought, everything commanded, does indeed announce itself as something alien, but on the other hand, as concept (universality), is something subjective, through which, as the product of a human power, the faculty of universality, of reason, it loses its objectivity, its positivity, heteronomy, and what is commanded presents itself [as] grounded in an autonomy of the human will. But by this course positivity is only partly taken away19); and between the Tungus shaman and the European prelate governing church and state, or the Mogul and the Puritan and the man obeying his commandment of duty, the difference is not that the former made themselves servants while the latter would be free20); but that the former has the master outside himself, while the latter carries the master within himself, but is at the same time his own servant; for the particular, drives, inclinations, pathological love, sensibility, or whatever it is called, the universal is necessarily and eternally something alien, something objective; there remains an indestructible positivity, which becomes completely outrageous through the fact that the content the universal commandment of duty receives, a definite duty, contains the contradiction of being restricted and universal at the same time, and for the sake of the form of universality makes the harshest pretensions on behalf of its one-sidedness. Woe to the human relations that are not found precisely in the concept of duty, which, as soon as it is not merely the empty thought of universality but is to present itself in an action, excludes or rules all other relations.
19) Deleted in the manuscript: for the commandment of duty is a universality that remains opposed to the particular, and this is what is oppressed when it rules.
20) Werkausgabe: compare Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, IV, 2, § 3
