[p. 325]
|325| Kant21) was very wrong to regard this kind of expression, which does not belong to the living – love God above all and your neighbour as yourself -, as a commandment that demands respect for a law that commands love. And on this confusion of the commandment of duty, which consists in the opposition of the concept and the actual, with the wholly inessential way of pronouncing the living, rests his profound reduction of what he calls a commandment – love God above all and your neighbour as yourself – to his commandment of duty. And his remark that love – or, in the meaning he believes he must give this love: performing all duties gladly – cannot be commanded falls away of itself, because in love every thought of duties falls away; and the honour he in turn bestows on that saying of Jesus, regarding it as the ideal of holiness attainable by no creature, is just as superfluously squandered; for such an ideal, in which duties would be represented as done gladly, is self-contradictory, because duties would demand an opposition and doing gladly no opposition; and he can bear this contradiction without union in his ideal, while however he declares rational creatures (a strange juxtaposition) [capable] of falling, incapable of attaining that ideal.
21) Werkausgabe: compare Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, part 1, book 1, ch. III
Jesus begins the Sermon on the Mount with a kind of paradoxes, in which his full soul at once declares unambiguously to the crowd of expectant listeners that they have to expect from him something wholly alien, another genius, another world. They are cries in which, inspired, he at once moves away from the common estimation of virtue, inspired, announces another right and light, another region of life, whose relation to the world could only be
