[p. 337]
|337| side is at the same time connected; because his definite positive service has a boundary and he cannot get beyond it, he is immoral beyond it. This immorality of positivity thus concerns another side of human relations than positive obedience – within its circle the non-moral is not immoral.26) In setting subjectivity against the positive, the indifference of service and its boundary vanish. Man stands for himself; his character and his deed become He himself; he has limits only where he sets them himself, and his virtues determinacies that he himself limits. This possibility of limiting opposition is freedom, the “or” in virtue or vice. In the opposition of law against nature, of the universal against the particular, the two opposites are posited, actual; the one is not without the other; in moral freedom
26) Deleted in the manuscript: But the opposite of virtue is immorality, vice. The speculative moralist, the moral teacher makes a philosophical description of virtue, – his description must be deduced; there must be no contradiction [in] it; a description of a thing is always the thing represented; if he holds this representation, the concept, up to the living, he says the living ought to be thus, – between the concept and the modification of a living being there ought to be no contradiction except solely that the former is something thought, the latter something that is. A virtue is in speculation alone, and is necessary, i.e. its concept, and the opposite cannot be; there is no change, no acquisition, no arising, no passing away in it as concept; but this concept, held together with the living, ought to be – virtue as a modification of the living either is, or also is not, can arise and pass away. The speculative moralist may well let himself be carried away into falling into a warm contemplation of the virtuous and the vicious; but his business is really only to wage war with the living, to polemicize against it, or merely to calculate his concepts quite coldly. But the teacher of the people, the improver of men, who turns to men themselves, can speak, not indeed of the arising of virtue, of education to virtue, but of the destructiveness of vice and the return to virtue. The destruction of vice consists in its bringing punishment on man. Punishment is the necessary evil consequence of a crime, but not every consequence can be called a punishment, e.g. not that character becomes still worse in crimes; one cannot say that he has deserved to become still worse.
