[p. 342]
|342| from the law, man still remains subject to it; and since the law as universal remains, the deed too remains, for it is the particular. – Punishment represented as fate is of a wholly different kind; in fate punishment is a hostile power, something individual, in which universal and particular are united also in the respect that in it the ought and the execution of this ought are not separated, as with the law, which is only a rule, something thought, and needs something opposed to it, something actual, from which it receives force. In this hostile power the universal is also not separated from the particular in the respect in which the law as universal is opposed to man or his inclinations as the particular. Fate is only the enemy, and man stands over against it just as much as a fighting power; whereas the law as universal rules the particular, has this man under its obedience. The crime of the man who is considered as caught under a fate is then not a rebellion of the subject against his ruler, the running away of the servant from his master, the freeing of oneself from a dependence; not a coming to life out of a dead state, for man is, and before the deed there is no separation, nothing opposed, much less something ruling. Only through a going out from the united life, regulated neither by laws nor contrary to laws, through killing life, is something alien created. Annihilation of life is not a non-being of it, but its separation, and the annihilation consists in its having been transformed into an enemy. It is immortal, and killed it appears as its terrifying ghost, which asserts all its branches, lets loose its Eumenides. The delusion of crime, which believes it destroys alien life and thereby enlarges itself, dissolves in this, that the departed spirit of the injured life comes forward against it, as Banquo, who came to Macbeth as a friend, was not destroyed in
