[p. 338]
|338| of the opposition of virtue and vice the one is excluded by the other; thus when the one is posited, the other is only possible. The opposition of duty and inclination has found its union in the modifications of love, in the virtues. Since the law was opposed to love not in its content but in its form, it could be taken up into love; but in this taking up it lost its shape; to crime, on the other hand, it is opposed in its content; it is excluded by it, and yet is; for crime is a destruction of nature; and since nature is one, as much is destroyed in what destroys as in what is destroyed. When what is one is opposed, the union of the opposites is present only in the concept; a law has been made; if the opposite has been destroyed, the concept, the law, remains; but it then expresses only what is lacking, a gap, because its content is sublated in actuality, and is called punishing law. This form of the law is immediate; it is opposed in its content to life, because it indicates its destruction; but all the harder does it seem to think how the law in this form, as punishing justice, could be sublated; in the previous sublation of the law through virtues only the form of the law vanished; its content remained; but here, with the form, its content too would be sublated, for its content is punishment.
Punishment lies immediately in the offended law; the criminal forfeits the same right that has been violated in another through a crime27). The criminal has put himself outside the concept that is the content of the law. The law indeed only says he ought to lose the right comprised in the law; [but] because it is immediately
27) Deleted in the manuscript: i.e. he deserves punishment; the necessity that it follows lies in something external and corresponds to the crime.
