[p. 329]
|329| which excludes even desire, which that duty did not forbid, and sublates, except for one case, this permission, which contradicted that duty. Thus on the one hand the holiness of love is the complement (the πλήϱωμα) of the law against adultery; and this holiness alone gives the capacity, when one of the many sides of man wanted to raise itself into the whole or against the whole, to hold it down; and only the sensation of the whole, love, is able to prevent the dispersion of one’s being, – on the other hand love sublates the permission to divorce; and as against love there can be no talk of permission and right, either while it lives or as it ceases. The ceasing of love towards a woman in whom love still is makes her become unfaithful to herself and sin; and a transfer of her passion is only a going astray of it, which she must atone for with a bad conscience. Her fate can admittedly not be spared her in this case, and the marriage is in itself separated; but the support the man fetches from a right and a law, through which he draws legality and propriety onto his side, means adding a base harshness to the injury to the woman’s love. Only in the case that Jesus excepts, when the woman has turned her love to another, can the man not remain her servant. To the Jews, σϰληϱοις ϰαϱδίᾳ, Moses had indeed to give laws and rights about marriage; but from the beginning it was not so.
In an assurance about something actual, the subject and the object are thought of as separated, or in an assurance about something future, in a promise, the declaration of a will and the deed itself [as] still wholly separated; and what matters is the truth, i.e. the firm connection of the two; in a sworn assurance the representation of the deed, either already done or only future, is tied to something divine, the connection of word and deed, the linkage,
