[p. 341]
|341|
And yet man cannot endure this anxiety; from the terrible actuality of evil and the unchangeability of the law he can flee only to grace; the pressure and pain of the bad conscience can drive him again into a dishonesty, to seek to run away from himself and thereby from the law and from justice; he throws himself into the lap of the administrator of abstract justice in order to experience his goodness, of which he hopes that it might close an eye to him, might see him otherwise than he is; he himself does not indeed deny his offences, but he makes the dishonest wish that goodness should itself deny his offences, and finds comfort in the thought, in the untrue representation that [an]other being might form of him. And so there would be no return to unity of consciousness on a pure path, no sublation of punishment, of the threatening law and of the bad conscience other than a dishonest begging; – if punishment had to be regarded merely as something absolute, if it stood under no condition and had no side from which, with its condition, it had a higher sphere above itself. Law and punishment cannot be reconciled, but can be sublated in the reconciliation of fate.
Punishment is the effect of a transgressed law from which man has broken away but on which he still depends and from which, neither from the punishment nor from his deed, he cannot escape. For since [the] character of the law is universality, the criminal has indeed broken the matter of the law, but the form, universality, remains, and the law over which he [believed] he had become master remains, but appears opposed in its content; it has the shape of the deed contradicting the previous law; the content of the deed now has the shape of universality and is law; this inversion of it, that it becomes the opposite of what it was before, is the punishment – in having freed himself
