[p. 343]
|343| his murder, but the moment after nevertheless took his seat; not as a companion at the meal, but as an evil spirit. The criminal thought he was dealing with alien life; but he has destroyed only his own life; for life is not different from life, because life is in the one Godhead; and in his arrogance he has indeed destroyed, but only the friendliness of life: he has turned it into an enemy. Only the deed has created a law whose rule now begins; this law is the union, in the concept of equality, of the apparently alien injured life and one’s own forfeited life. Only now does the injured life come forward as a hostile power against the criminal and mistreat him as he has mistreated; thus punishment as fate is the equal reaction of the criminal’s own deed, of a power that he himself armed, of an enemy whom he himself made his enemy. With fate a reconciliation seems still harder to conceive than with the punishing law, since in order to reconcile fate the annihilation seems to have to be sublated. But with respect to reconcilability fate has this advantage over the punishing law, that it is located within the domain of life, a crime under law and punishment [on the other hand] in the domain of insuperable oppositions, of absolute actualities. In this no possibility is conceivable of how punishment could be sublated and the consciousness of the bad actuality vanish, because the law is a power to which life is subject, above which there is nothing, above which not even the Godhead is, for it is only the force of the highest thought, only the administrator of the law. An actuality can only be forgotten, i.e. lose itself as something represented in another weakness, whereby its being would nevertheless be posited as abiding. But with punishment as fate the law is later than life and stands lower than it. It is only its gap, the lacking
