[p. 361]
|361| satisfy all, to make an order of rank, he declares himself not so indebted to those he puts behind as to others whom he calls higher; virtues can thus cease to be absolute duty, they can even become vices. In this many-sidedness of relations and multitude of virtues nothing remains but the despair of virtue and the crime of virtue itself. Only if no virtue claims to subsist firmly and absolutely in its restricted form, if it renounces having to enter even in the relationship in which it alone can enter; if the one living spirit acts solely according to the whole of the given relationships, but in complete unrestrictedness, without being at the same time divided by their manifoldness, and restricts itself, then only the many-sidedness of the relationships remains, but the multitude of absolute and incompatible virtues vanishes. There can be no talk here of one and the same principle underlying all virtues, which [is] always the same [but] appears under different relationships in different modification as a particular virtue; for precisely because such a principle is something universal and thus a concept, under definite relationships the definite application, a definite virtue, a certain duty must necessarily enter (the manifold relationships as given actualities, likewise the principle [as] the rule for all, and thus the applications of the principle to the actualities, the manifold virtues, are unchangeable); in such an absoluteness of subsisting the virtues destroy one another. Their unity through the rule is only apparent, because it is only something thought, and such a unity neither sublates nor unites the manifoldness, but lets it subsist in its whole strength.
A living bond of the virtues, a living unity, is quite different from the unity of the concept; it does not set up a definite virtue for definite relationships,
