The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate (1798–1800)

[p. 305]

|305| he must be spoken of, and no gods are possible; the gods are only the ideals of the individual separations; if everything is separated, there is only one ideal.

To destroy the objectivity of the commandments, of the laws, [means] to show that something is grounded on a need of man, on nature; to forgive sins (ἀϕιέναι), remit, usually to sublate the punishments of sins – this a miracle, for the effect cannot be separated from the cause, but above all fate cannot be annihilated; if one thinks of a sublation of punishment, the punishment is something wholly objective, coming from something objective, not wholly necessarily connected with the guilt – in general, even if one takes punishment as something wholly inseparable from guilt, it is nevertheless objective to the extent that it is the consequence of a law from which one has broken free in the transgression, but on which one still depends; with an objective law and judge the law is satisfied when I have been maltreated as I maltreated, when the separation I made has worked back on me in the same way, – in moral punishment what is separated is not something external that I flee, that I can overpower; the deed is the punishment in itself; as much as with the deed I apparently injured alien life, so much I have injured my own; life as life is not different from life; the injured life stands over against me as fate; it is satisfied when I have felt its power, – the power of the dead, just as in the crime I acted merely as power. The law cannot be reconciled, for it always persists in its terrible majesty and cannot be got at through love; for it is hypothetical, and the possibility can never be sublated; the condition under which it comes into play can never become impossible; it rests as long as this condition does not occur, but is not sublated; but this rest is no reconciliation, because the law is indeed not something so subsisting that it would always have to be effective and separate, but because it is conditioned, because it is possible only under [the condition of] a separation. Fate, on the other hand, can be reconciled, because it is itself one of the members, something separated, which as separated cannot be annihilated by its opposite, but can be sublated through union. Fate is the law itself that I have set up in the action (whether this be the transgression of another law or not), in its reaction on me; punishment is only the consequence of another law – the necessary consequence of something that has happened cannot be sublated; the action would have to be made undone; where there are nothing but causes and effects, as separated things,

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