[p. 326]
|326| to be hated and persecuted by it. In this kingdom of heaven, however, he shows them not the dissolution of the laws, but they must be fulfilled through a righteousness that is another, in which there is more, which is more complete than the righteousness of the dutiful: a filling out of what is deficient in the laws.
Cross-reference: On the critique of the mere ought and of duty “for duty’s sake” in the Groundlines: § 135.
He then shows this filling out in several laws; one can call this something containing more within itself an inclination to act as the laws would command22), oneness of inclination with the law, whereby the latter loses its form as law; this agreement of inclination is the πλήϱωμα of the law, a being that, as one otherwise put it, is the complement of possibility; for possibility is the object as something thought, the universal; being [is] the synthesis of subject and object, in which subject and object have lost their opposition; likewise that inclination, a virtue, is a synthesis in which the law (which Kant therefore always calls an objective one) loses its universality and likewise the subject its particularity, – both their opposition; [whereas] in Kantian virtue this opposition remains and the one becomes the ruler, the other the ruled. The agreement of inclination with the law is of such a kind that law and inclination are no longer different; and the expression agreement of inclination with the law therefore becomes quite unsuitable, because in it law and inclination still occur as particular, as opposed, and a support of the moral disposition, of respect for [the] law and of the will’s being determined by the law, by the inclination different from it, could easily be understood; and since the things agreeing are different, the agreement too would be only contingent, only the unity
22) Deleted in the manuscript: not the support of the moral disposition by inclination, but an inclined moral disposition, i.e. a moral disposition without struggle.
