[p. 349]
|349| renounce power and let something alien, a law in the mouth of the judge, pronounce on them; they thus submit to a treatment against which each party nevertheless protested when they contradicted the offence to their right, i.e. set themselves against treatment by another. What is true in both opposites, bravery and passivity, is so united in beauty of soul that of the former the life remains but the opposition falls away; of the latter the loss of right remains, but the pain vanishes. And so there emerges a sublation of right without suffering, a living, free elevation above the loss of right and above the struggle. He who lets go of that which another approaches with hostility, who ceases to call his own what the other touches, escapes the pain of loss, escapes being dealt with by the other or by the judge, escapes the necessity of dealing with the other; whatever side of him is touched, from it he withdraws and leaves to the other only a thing that he has made alien at the moment of attack. This giving up of his relations, which is an abstraction from himself, has however no fixed limits32). (The more living the relations from which, because they are stained, a noble nature must withdraw, since it could not remain in them without defiling itself, the greater is its misfortune; but this misfortune is neither unjust nor just; it becomes its fate only through its disdaining those relations with its own will, with freedom; all the pains that arise for it from this are then just and are now its unhappy fate, which it has itself made consciously, and it is its honour to suffer justly, for it is so far elevated above these rights that it was willing to have them as enemies. And because this fate lies in itself, it can
32) Deleted in the manuscript: it is a self-killing that must finally withdraw into the void.
