[p. 216]
|216| sets itself ends independently from its essence alone, but of a reason to which ends are set from outside and which then reflects in conformity with them, now inventing subordinate ends, now inferring higher ones from them. The contradiction between the two parties: whether in grounding the highest science for man one must start from a history, reduces to the question: can the highest end of reason be given to it only by itself; does it not contradict the innermost of its essence if it is set for it from outside or through alien authority – or is reason incapable of this?
At this point alone should the opponents of miracles hold the defenders of them fast. To engage in historical and exegetical discussions, to go onto their field, means not knowing one’s right or not asserting it, and the defenders of miracles have the game won. For even if one could show of every single miracle that it can be explained naturally (although all such explanations hitherto turn out forced in the highest degree for most of them, and on the whole can never turn out satisfying for everyone until the principle has become universal that no history, no authority can set reason its highest end), one has already conceded too much to the defender. If only one miracle could not be explained, reason would have lost its right. This is the highest standpoint on which we must place ourselves. To engage in conducting the dispute before the tribunal of the understanding already proves that we do not stand quite firm there, that the narration of miraculous events has made us hesitate, that we do not dare to reject them from there alone, but that the facts passed off to us as miracles might be capable of overturning that self-standing independence of reason.
If one descends with the defender of miracles onto the field of the understanding, there is long and wide dispute about possibility and impossibility. This point too is commonly left undecided, and when it comes to particulars, the opponent of miracles either demands that the perceptions be raised to experiences, i.e. explained from laws of nature, or, if he doubts this, he denies the perceptions themselves – and the two parties no longer understand each other. The defender of miracles cannot comprehend what interest the opponent can have in explaining away or denying miracles; for by engaging in this the opponent has betrayed his indecision as to whether his reason can stand by itself or not. The clumsiness
