[p. 188]
|188| has been failed to be recognized by the system of the church, then the system of the church can be nothing other than a system of contempt for men. The salutary separation of the domains of the powers of the human spirit that Kant made for science has not been made by the legislation of the church, and centuries will still pass before the spirit of Europeans learns to recognize and make in active life, in legislations, that distinction to which the right feeling of the Greeks had brought them of itself. The moral commandments of reason are namely treated and set up in the Christian church, as in every church whose principle is pure morals, just like rules of the understanding11); the former are subjective, the latter objective; by the Christian church, on the other hand, the subjective element of reason is set up as a rule like something objective.
11) Werkausgabe: Nohl proposes this reading: “Die moralischen Gebote der Vernunft werden nämlich in der Religion der Griechen … nicht wie Regeln des Verstandes behandelt …” (The moral commandments of reason are namely, in the religion of the Greeks … not treated like rules of the understanding …)
Reason sets up moral, necessary and universally valid laws; insofar these are called objective by Kant, though in another sense than the rules of the understanding; now to make these laws subjective or into maxims, to find motives for them, this is the task where attempts diverge infinitely. That capacity of reason the theologians have seldom denied, and nowadays it is granted to reason fairly generally – or if they have done so, they have understood by it chiefly the second, namely that reason is not able to give its law such motives as would be capable by themselves of procuring respect for the law and inclining the will to act in conformity with it; the Christian religion gives us objective motives, motives that are not the law itself.
