[p. 175]
|175| of civil society and the same rights had been granted to the ecclesiastical state as to the civil state.
Now as regards these arrangements for preserving its doctrine, a contract can certainly take place, i.e. it can here be left to the majority of votes, to representatives or to the prince to organize these arrangements according to their insights, to examine and appoint the teachers of the people. Whether this church can have the right [to depose] an official it has appointed, but who with his congregation departs from the ecclesiastical doctrine and breaks away from the church, there can be no question at all, for this congregation now forms a church of its own, over which another church can absolutely have no power, which can be regarded as a state holding power only within itself. The new congregation owes this church, and perhaps the state too, at most the declaration that it has separated from it, a justification to neither of the two; and if the old church perhaps did not want to recognize this separation and called the state to help to prevent it, which it has close at hand, because a dominant church is one that exercises the rights of the state to its own advantage, it would be the unremitting duty of the state to protect the new church in the freedom of its faith and the exercise of its worship. Another question, which has received a very widespread interest in recent times, is whether the heads of the church, who smell a rat, can take office and bread away from such a preacher. They assert quite consistently that it is their duty to protect the faith of the church and to see to it that it is taught; a preacher who teaches otherwise is thus not fit to be an official. In the Catholic church this right of the church is absolutely not disputed; in the Protestant church, on the other hand, many reason against it on the ground that it would bring the church infinitely more honour if it made virtue
