[p. 201]
|201| such an imagination becomes native to a people. What in our holy books is real history, like the greatest part of the Old Testament, and does not really carry the duty of faith as the New Testament does, and can thus really become the object of popular imagination, is so alien to our customs, our constitution, the culture of our bodily and mental powers that there is almost no point where we meet with it, except here and there universal human nature, – and [is] for everyone who begins to be enlightened, i.e. to demand universality for the laws of his understanding and his experience – and the number of this class of men is always rising -, for the most part unpalatable and usable only for two classes of readers: for the one that with holy simplicity takes everything as true in the sense that it is convinced it would also have been accessible to general experience, and for the other class, to which this question of truth and untruth for the understanding does not occur at all, but which thinks only of subjective truth, truth for the imagination, as we read them in Herder’s hand.16)
16) Hegel’s footnote. That different way of reading the old legends with the understanding or with the imagination can be seen in the example of the history of Moses, when it is related of him that he saw God on Sinai; an ordinary Christian reader takes this as a sense perception that took place according to the laws of all our sense perceptions; the enlightened, intelligent Recha [in Lessing’s Nathan III, 2] says: where he stood, he stood before God, [she] grants the objective existence of God, but denies the possibility that he could be perceived by human senses, and asserts that God is present to him [i.e. to man] everywhere, even if he does not think of it, – and in this case denies in particular the sensuous presence of God. – In yet another sense it can be asserted that at that place and in that moment, when Moses believed he had sensed the presence of God, the Deity was as truly present to him as any sensation ever has truth for us, but without wanting to pronounce on the object, about which there can be no question in this judgement; one asserts only at the same time that at the place and in the moment where man does not think of God, God is not present.
The first judgement asserts the sense perception of God as an object, the second denies the sense perception but asserts that God was there, the third asserts the perception of God, but not as an object. The first asserts that in Moses senses and understanding were active, the second – only imagination, the third – imagination and reason. To the one who pronounces the second judgement only the object speaks, and he judges it as an object, according to the laws of his understanding and his experience; to the spirit of the one who pronounces the third judgement the spirit of Moses itself speaks immediately – which he understands, which is revealed to him – unconcerned about the object.
The first asserts subjective and objective truth, the second objective truth but subjective error, the third subjective truth and – if it were permitted to speak so – objective error.
