[p. 135]
|135| before the duty arises for me; a very conscientious man may hesitate to regard another’s legal claims as valid before the other has deduced them; but when he has convinced himself of the right of the other, he will also recognize for himself, even without the verdict of a judge, the duty to satisfy those claims; but the knowledge that something is a duty for him springs only from the knowledge of the right of the other. – But there are still other duties that do not spring from the right of another, – e.g. the duty of charity. The unfortunate man has no right for himself to my purse, except insofar as he presupposes that I ought to make it a duty for myself to assist the unfortunate; for me my duty is not grounded in his right; his right to life, health etc. is directed not at individuals but at humanity in general (the child’s right to live is directed at the parents), which imposes on the state, or in general on the people who are nearest to him, the duty of maintaining him, – not on the individual. (One often hears the excuse, when a man is expected to help a poor person by himself alone: he does not know why he; another could do it just as well as he; he more readily agrees to a contribution in company with others, partly, admittedly, because the whole sum of the costs does not fall on him in this way, but partly because he feels that this duty belongs not to him alone but to others too.) The poor man has to demand alms as a right from me as a member of the state; he makes the demand here immediately, where he ought to make it mediately through the state; to me as a moral being it is a moral demand in the name of the moral law to impose on me the duty of charity, – to me as a pathological being (endowed with sympathetic inclinations) he makes no demand, but works on me as a natural being by arousing my compassion.
Justice relates to my respecting the rights of others;
