[p. 160]
|160| just as on that contract the subjection of the will of the individual to the will of the sovereign also rested – a theory whose assertion or refutation is indifferent to us here -; yet this much remains, that it lies in the nature of civil society, however it and the rights of its rulers and legislators may have arisen, that in it the rights of the individual have become rights of the state, that the state [binds itself] to assert and protect my rights as its own. With the rights of the church as a state, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that, at least at its formation, its contract and its rights were grounded solely on the voluntary consent of all individuals. In this state the general will, i.e. the majority of votes, is expressed as laws of faith; and the society binds itself to protect this faith, one for all and all for one; partly for the organization and order of the general assembly in which the laws are made, partly for the protection of these laws of faith, to which instruction of every kind and public worship belong above all, the ecclesiastical state needs officials and has appointed them.
As regards the one point, the agreement of all in one faith, it is now a very great difference whether the contract of the church is regarded in such a way that its union arose of itself from the agreement of the faith of all, and whether in the common faith only the faith of all is expressed, or whether this faith was also partly fixed by the majority of votes and whether this was assumed to be possible. The latter principle was solemnly adopted by the Catholic church, in that the highest power is assigned to the church councils to decide in the last instance what the faith of the church is, and indeed it is the majority of votes to which each respective minority
