The Positivity of the Christian Religion (1795/96)

[p. 192]

|192| under the name of nature, fate or providence -, but also such a superior power over his spirit, over the whole extent of his being, cannot withdraw from a positive faith. The capacity for such a faith necessarily presupposes loss of the freedom of reason, of its self-standing independence, which is able to oppose nothing to an alien power. Here is the first point from which all faith or unbelief in a positive religion proceeds, and at the same time the centre around which all disputes about it turn; and even if it does not come to clear consciousness, it nevertheless constitutes the ground of all submissiveness or recalcitrance. Here the orthodox must hold fast, here give away nothing; – even if they grant that morality really is the absolute and highest end of humanity, even if they grant that reason is able – because they cannot deny what happens before their eyes – to build a pure system of morals, they must nevertheless assert that it is unable by itself to procure for itself primacy over the inclinations, to realize its demands, and they must necessarily determine these demands, the final end of humanity, in such a way that, if not in positing it, then in its practicability, man is dependent on a being outside him. Once this incapacity of reason and the dependence of our whole being is presupposed, which is the necessary condition of all that follows, the proof that a certain religion, e.g. the Christian, is such a positive religion given by God is to be conducted wholly historically, and this is all the easier because, with the recognition of our servitude, we have thereby laid aside the measure of any other examination, have wholly renounced the right to ask about inner grounds, about its conformity to reason, to examine the conformity of the events narrated to the laws of experience. – The question of conformity or contrariety to reason is here a wholly idle question, which may perhaps be raised out of boredom, but which absolutely may not be regarded as contributing to the decision of my faith – before the higher court, once it is recognized, all lower ones must be silent. What is held true because it conforms to reason never lies within the scope of my positive faith, although it can happen that what I at first believed merely because faith in it was commanded me, I afterwards believe because I now find it conformable to my reason, because I have convinced myself of it from grounds; that the whole content of a

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