[p. 220]
|220|
One would have understood what has been said so far badly if one wanted to see in it a justification of all the presumptions of established religions, of all superstition, all ecclesiastical despotism, all dullness produced or nourished by false religious arrangements. No! the most feeble-minded, hardest superstition is nothing positive for a soulless being having human shape; but as soon as soul awakens in it, and the demand of superstition remained, it would become positive for one who otherwise stood quite unselfconsciously under it; but for the one judging it, it is necessarily something positive, precisely because, as a judge, an ideal of humanity must hover before him. But an ideal of human nature is something quite different from universal concepts about the determination of man and about the relation of man to God. The ideal very well admits particularity, determinacy, and even demands peculiar religious actions, feelings, customs, an abundance, a multitude of superfluous things, which before the lantern light of universal concepts appear only as ice and stone. Only when the superfluous sublates freedom does it become positive, i.e. when it makes pretensions against the understanding and reason and contradicts their necessary laws. The universality of this criterion must be restricted by the fact that understanding and reason can be judges only when appeal is made to them; what makes no claim to being intelligent or rational does not belong at all to their jurisdiction. And herein lies a chief point whose neglect produces such opposed judgements. Understanding and reason can summon everything before their tribunal and easily make the presumption that everything should be intelligent, everything rational, and thus they admittedly discover enough of the positive, and the outcry about slavery of spirit, oppression of conscience, superstition has no end at all. The most unselfconscious actions, the most innocent feelings, the most beautiful presentations of the imagination suffer this rough treatment. But the effect is appropriate to this unsuitable doing. The intelligent people believe they speak truth when they speak intelligently to feeling, to the imagination, to religious needs, and cannot comprehend how their truth is resisted, why they preach to deaf ears; the fault is that they offer stones to the child who asks for bread; when a house is to be built, their wares have usefulness. But likewise, if bread laid claim to fitness for building houses, they would rightly object.
In a religion actions, persons, memories
