[p. 136]
|136| it is a virtue if I make it my maxim as a duty, not because the state demands it, but because it is a duty, and insofar it is a demand not of the state but of the moral law. – The second kind of duties, e.g. in the case of charity as a contribution to the poor fund, the establishment of hospitals, can be demanded by the state not as by an individual against an individual, but [only] as a duty of the citizens as a whole; charity [is] in general a duty that morals demand.
Besides these, duties may occur that spring neither from rights against me as an individual nor from rights against humanity in general, but do not spring from the rights of others at all, rather which I have imposed on myself voluntarily (not from a demand of the moral law), where the rights I grant another are likewise granted merely from free choice. Of this kind are the duties I impose on myself voluntarily in entering some society whose end is not opposed to the end of the state (in which case I would offend against the rights of the state); through my entry into such a society the members receive certain rights over me, which are grounded merely on my voluntary entry and the duties thereby voluntarily assumed. The rights I grant such a society over me cannot be rights that the state has over me; otherwise I would recognize a power existing in the state, different from the state, that would have the same rights as it; the state cannot permit me to grant a society the right of judging over a life or, as judge, in a dispute about property (as a friendly arbitrator, to whose verdict I voluntarily submit, certainly). Now I can also grant such a society the right to supervise my morality, to guide me in this respect, to demand confessions of my faults from me, to impose penances on me for them;
