[p. 195]
|195| faith here faithfully makes his whole condition the object of his reflection, only that, as he is otherwise determined by the representations given him in positive religion, he here thinks of this determination not as passing through the medium of representation, but as going to his activity, his very being. As regards the demands of practical reason that positive religion promises to satisfy, they are of two kinds; some it [i.e. reason] wishes to see realized, but it would be afraid of the realization of others – on account of both, positive religion promises to reassure it. The very expression “reason wishes” or “it is afraid” indicates that sensibility comes into play here, that it might perhaps really be sensibility that [puts] it into reason’s head to make those demands, and that it is really sensibility that wants to be satisfied. – How does reason, in the postulate of the harmony of happiness with ethical life, which has become famous especially in recent times and occurs among all peoples, come to a demand on something that it recognizes in this respect as independent of itself, as not determinable by it? Reason, which in some subject has grown to a degree of dominion, of power, gives consciousness this feeling of ought, of ruling; if it turns with it to the will, which has a definite object of drive, the will is active according to the form given by reason, summons the physical powers; whether these conquer or succumb in the struggle with alien resisting powers, and the will has remained firm [in this], reason is satisfied in any case; and when someone has died a death for honour or for fatherland or virtue, it is only in our times that one has been able to say the man would have deserved a better fate. Where reason finds a will that is more ruled by the sensuous inclinations, and where it seldom finds occasion to turn to it, in such subjects sensibility perceives its voice, its ought; and explains this according to its own needs and interprets this ought of reason as a demand for happiness, which demand, however, differs from the sensuous demand for happiness in that it is grounded on a voice of reason, that it presupposes a power of reason to be able to pronounce an ought, – and this demand, legitimated as it were by reason, is then called worthiness of happiness,
