[p. 225]
|225| torpor and annihilation of a faith in something wholly alien and overpowering. One sees that the investigation of this, if it were to be conducted thoroughly through concepts, would in the end pass over into a metaphysical consideration of the relation of the finite to the infinite; but this is not the intention of this treatise; it takes as its basis the necessity that in human nature itself the need [lies] to recognize a being higher than human doing is in our consciousness, to make the beholding of its perfection the animating spirit of life, and also to devote time, arrangements and feelings to this beholding immediately, without connection with other ends. This general need of a religion includes many individual needs; how far their satisfaction belongs to nature, how far the contradictions into which nature falls with itself can be resolved by nature itself, whether the Christian religion contains the only possible resolution of them and whether this resolution lies wholly outside nature, whether man can grasp it only through the passivity of faith, – these questions, the inquiry into their true sense and their development, will perhaps find a place elsewhere. If the resolution of those tasks of the human heart, or, if one will, of practical reason, given by the Christian religion is recognized by reason as contingency only superficially, according to the outward appearance, namely as definite doing, definite doctrine, then it is to be remarked in general that it must not be forgotten that the contingent is only one side of what counts as holy. If a religion has attached something eternal to something transient, and reason fixes only the transient and now cries out about superstition, then it is its fault to have gone to work superficially and to have overlooked the eternal. In the following treatise doctrines or commandments of the Christian religion will not be held up to this measure of universal concepts and judged by them as to whether they lie in these concepts or contradict them, or would at least be something superfluous and thus irrational and unnecessary; such contingencies, which lose their character of contingency through something eternal being connected with them, therefore necessarily have two sides, and the separation of these two sides is separation by reason; in religion itself they are not separated; to religion itself, or better: to the religious, universal concepts could not be applied at all, because it itself is no concept. Of such contingencies, first made only by reflection,
