[p. 172]
|172| state, and that protection, that guarantee, is necessarily included in the social contract; and it is possible only in an ill-organized state or, as already said, in a state that has not known this duty, has not vindicated this right of protection for itself, that its citizens or a part of them can come into the position of having to assert this right by force for their part too, or of not being allowed to enjoy it. In this position the Protestants found themselves, and the princes who spoke courageously and fought bravely against another part of the state power for the right of free exercise of religion of their subjects did so out of princely duty; but of the inconveniences of their concluding peace and treaties not also as princes but as members or heads of a church we have spoken above. Since the church thus cannot protect its faith against force, nothing remains but to protect and preserve it against itself.
If the faith to be protected is to be regarded as a common faith from which one or another deviated wholly or in individual parts, such a one would for that very reason no longer be a member of the church, and he would have renounced its benefits, just as it would have no rights over him any more; but if it should nevertheless have the right over him that he would be obliged to let himself be instructed by it and to obey its precepts about what he should do or leave undone, this right could be grounded only in his having bound himself in the contract with the church, for future cases, to trust the majority of votes or the representatives of the church in determining the true faith and to let himself be guided by it in this; but this would mean ascribing a kind of infallibility to the church, and to protest against an authority of this kind is the highest duty of a true Protestant. – The one who thinks otherwise would here be in the position of transgressing the civil laws, whose holders of power compel him
