[p. 153]
|153| their worship and to appoint teachers according to their mind, whereas the hitherto dominant church asserts its right to the property transferred to it and never disputed; if the state has strength enough to assert its right, and its administrators are insightful, impartial and just enough to know this right of its and to want to assert it, it will grant each church, according to its needs, the means of holding its worship according to its mind. Now although a state, as a civil state, and its legislators and administrators as such, ought to have no faith, it usually happens that it is imposed on them as a duty by the dominant church, as members of it, to protect the rights of the dominant church; and the conflict between the two churches is usually decided not according to the rights of the state, but usually by force on the one side and necessity on the other. For when the church that nestles in spreads so much that, by asserting the rights of the contesting church, which could be upheld only by extirpating the adherents of the new doctrine or at least only by great acts of violence and great expense, too great a harm to the state and too deep an offence to its laws and rights would arise, it is reminded thereby of its danger and grants the new church some rights, but uses in doing so the language of the church and calls this toleration; – or if the conflict is settled in another way, namely that the hitherto oppressed church becomes dominant and the hitherto dominant one then becomes only the tolerated one, then commonly the state too enters again into the same alliance with the now dominant church and asserts its rights for it again as unrestrictedly as for the previous one. It is evident from this, as from what was said above, that the observation many acute historians have made, that, to one’s astonishment, every church, unmindful of the sufferings it has endured, the remembrance of which
