[p. 171]
|171| unchangeable norms of faith, but protests against all authority in matters of faith, against all obligations that would contradict that holy right; and if the church were willing to be content with this negative determination, it would have the merit of having reminded the state of a duty it otherwise failed to recognize, to protect the freedom of their faith for its subjects, and of having defended in its stead [what] it neglected.
Through every contract that the church makes with each or some individual members, or that each individual makes with it, if this contract concerns rights that really take place only in the civil state, it becomes unjust towards itself – or towards individual members of it. One does not feel this exactly, but it must reveal itself sooner or later, and then a citizen who leaves the church and thereby loses civil rights demands them back from the state in vain; for the state had neglected to determine his rights, and since it let the church do so in its stead, the church regards his rights as its own and asserts them as such; for it asserted what was sufficient for its purpose, the universal right, freedom of faith and worship, only for an individual, for its own case.
But if the formation of a church as regards faith cannot be regarded as a contract at all, but a church, a union for a purpose, arises of itself from the general uniformity of faith, then this purpose can be the protection and preservation of this faith, the ordering of a worship conforming to it, and the production in the members of those qualities that conform to the ecclesiastical ideal of perfection.
Now as regards the protection and preservation of faith, and what is meant by this is protection of faith and at the same time of the free exercise of worship and of the upholding of other ordinances, this is really a duty of the
