Jena Philosophy of Spirit

[p. 215]

|215| is laid down as the ground; from this concept it is to be developed. To this I bring in the determination of right; I show from it that he is capable of rights, a person; – but this showing falls within me; it is the movement of my thought; but the content is the free self; – but this movement does not leave this as it is – or it is the movement of this concept – Right is the relation of the person in its conduct towards the other – the universal element of its free being – or the determination, limitation of its empty freedom. This relation or limitation I do not have to hatch out for myself and bring in; rather the object is itself this producing of right in general, i.e. of the recognising relation – In recognising, the self ceases to be this singular; it is rightful in recognising, i.e. no longer in its immediate existence. What is recognised is recognised as immediately valid, through its being; – but precisely this being is produced from the concept; it is recognised being; man is necessarily recognised and is necessarily recognising. This necessity is his own, not that of our thinking in opposition to the content. As recognising he is himself the movement, and this movement sublates precisely his state of nature; he is recognising; the natural only is, – it is not spiritual.

The individuals, as they are towards one another, do not yet recognise one another; rather, their being is disturbed; the one has disturbed it through his possession; this possession is not yet property.⁶²⁾ – The right of possession is immediately directed against

62) In the margin: If I therefore consider him in this state of nature, as immediately possessing, and ask what is right here, this requires an absolute determination; that, however, is contingent being; just as contingent is their relation to one another, and no determination is to be gained – It seems the thing, because it is mine, I am to be recognised, is valid immediately and in the form of immediacy; this recognising is right.

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