Jena Philosophy of Spirit

[p. 229]

|229| will; my externalization is mediated through his; I will to externalize myself only because he too for his part wills to externalize himself; and because his negation becomes my position. It is an exchange of declaring, no longer of things – but it counts for as much as the thing itself. For both, the will of the other counts as such. – Will has gone back into its concept.

Here, however, this separation [enters], which can just as much turn over into the opposite; the going into itself. The will as such has validity, – it is freed from actuality; precisely in this, is the opposite – singular and common will separate; – the former as negative of the universal, crime only insofar as I am recognised, my will counts as universal, as will in itself; – not offence, violation before recognition. Or the common will has in contract only positive significance for mine, as mine for it; they agree. – But they can also not agree; I can break the contract unilaterally; for my singular will counts as such; not only insofar as it is common, but the common will itself indeed is only insofar as my singular will counts; – both are equally essential, my singular will as much [as] the equality; my singular will is cause – and the singular and the universal appear here as stepping apart in such a way that my will counts insofar as it is only will, insofar as I have not yet performed. But performance is existence, or is the existing universal will. – It therefore steps apart in representation into [the will] as universally valid will, and the will in existence; the former counts for the latter; and yet it is not the same.

Positing the distinctness actually, I thus break the contract; the other recognised my non-existing will; – he was content with it; the not-existing, not-having-performed was to be sublated, it is true, an ought, but he recognised the ought as ought; – precisely in the will counting as such lies the indifference towards existence and time. –⁹²⁾

92) In the margin: Contradiction of the ought, of represented existence

Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103