[p. 231]
|231| particular will, not as person against person; I neither will at this, nor is this the universal will as such, that which steps forward; rather it is hidden under the determinate thing; the universal will as common, and it as my pure will or person, is represented in the particular. – And my pure will as such is in speech, my declaration; – in it, it has taken itself back from the immediate existence of exchange, but it is only significance of the particular performance; and the common will only dissolution not of the person as such but of the person as particular existence; coercion is directed not at the person but only at its determinateness, its existence.
But95) according to the concept, existence is dissolved in the person and in the universal will; or it is only as pure person and as purely universal will, as pure negativity; this is the force of contract; just as in performing I laid my will into an existence, i.e. particularity, but could do this only as person, i.e. because the will counts as being in general, so I was also coerced as person, for in this negation of my existence my being in general was also negated, for the two are inseparable; – I am reflected into myself. – Precisely in coercion this comes to presence; – not this particularity is coerced, but I. The concept is therefore posited, set up, that the universal will absorbs the singular I into itself, – as existing against it, – the whole singular, and that I am for myself, recognised, as person; not only my belongings and property is posited here, but my person, or this insofar as my whole lies in my existence, honour and life.
95) In the margin: I hold not to what the other thinks I should perform, but to what is; this counts
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