[p. 232]
c. Crime and punishment96)
96) In the margin: Contract concerns property, existence, not person; for it is this mediation which intuits itself in the thing, in existence (as in the family goods, not child tool in the will, not yet)
Cross-reference: Coercion and crime § 90 ff., on punishment § 99 ff., on revenge § 102.
(About my honour and life no contract takes place) – the contract is sublated according to its concept, not [as] a singular one.97) – The contract posited my will in a separable particularity; – I have given this away, as in exchange, and what has come to be is the existence of myself as pure person, and so I now step forward as something recognised according to my pure will – existence has in contract stepped back into a mere consequence; but in contract as such the matter is settled. – Here the necessary movement seems to be sublated;98) the violation of my honour and life [appears] as something contingent. – But this violation is necessary – I have been coerced; – not only according to my existence, but precisely according to my I, as reflected into myself in my existence. – The recognition of my person in contract lets precisely me count as existing; my word already for the performance; i.e. I, my mere will, is not separated from my existence, both equal – it is precisely this that coercion and force contradict, for in my existence it violates me.
97) In the margin: In contract my word has the significance of the thing; but [as] contract about the person it would be my word, my immediate pure being itself that I staked; there is nothing binding here – i.e. the determinate existence is personal service
98) In the margin: I have kept the contract, man of my word, i.e. who counts as ideal pure person, as in-itself, as being – inviolability of the pure person – of life, or of my will as free will, pure concurrence, which has not yet bound itself to an existence.
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