[p. 233]
|233| I am offended, as in the movement of recognition; the other has violated my possession, – not, as in that movement, immediately only my form, but my recognised will as such, which he recognised as being in existence, inseparably bound up with it. – I hold myself to be violated, and indeed as person, according to the concept – going to and fro between existence as something external and as something into which my I is laid, or which is inner. – The contradiction emerges in me as inequality of my first and second word, but it is the same as I as universal and as particular; – or in concluding a determinate business with me, the other took my pure will as that which is unequal to itself, as the universal that has a determinate existence.
– Against coercion I therefore restore my being-for-me; not, as in the movement of recognition, my I violated as such, but my violated recognised I; – I will show him that he is after all not to be able to coerce me, i.e. that my I bound to the determinate performance, and the coercion that I suffered in it, was a violation of my pure I; – I find my honour injured; only my will was sublated on the side of this determinate existence, but thereby my thought, pure will. I step forward as person against the person of another; I sublate his being as universal, the security of his person; – I show him that in this existence, determinateness, he violates me as universal, and thus conducted himself unequally, since it was only a matter of the determinate thing; I therefore stand back against him; in his performance towards me his will was not violated, but he had his will and only externalized himself of a determinate existence. – His coercion, however, is an externalization of my will. I sublate this inequality, him as will, as he me – I take revenge on him, not as in the state of nature merely as on self-conscious activity, for itself, but as on a will, i.e. here one that at the same time
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