Jena Philosophy of Spirit

[p. 226]

|226| In exchange the abstract thing presents⁸⁵⁾ what it is, namely to be this change, to go back in thinghood into the I, and indeed in such a way that its thinghood consisted in being the possession of another. Each himself gives his possession, sublates his existence, and in such a way that he is recognised in this, that the other receives it with the consent of the first; they are recognised; each receives from the other the possession of the other, so that he obtains only insofar as the other himself [is] this negative of himself – or as property through mediation. – Each is that which negates his being, his belongings, and this is mediated through the negating of the other; only because the other parts with his thing do I do so – and this equality in the thing, as its inner, is its value, which has entirely my concurrence and the meaning⁸⁶⁾ of the other, – the positive mine, and likewise the his; the unity of my will and his; and my [will] counts as actual, existing; being-recognised is existence; thereby my will counts, I possess; possession is transformed into property. In possession, being has the unspiritual significance of my having as this singular; here, however, being-recognised – the being of possession, that the thing is and I am, and the former as comprised in the self – Here

85) In the margin: b) in his abstract labour he intuits the universality of himself, of his form, or that it is for another; – he therefore wills to posit this – to communicate it to others. Or these others are themselves to be intuited in it. Second movement, which contains the moments of the first developed – I doing towards another I, and indeed as recognised by it; – as one that relates to my possession but wills to have it only with my will, just as I relate to his only with his will – the equality of both as recognised – value, significance of the thing

86) In the margin: The thing has the significance of relation to others, being for another; existence is being-recognised, i.e. the particular will of each singular is in it, and the equality of this will – unity of what is absolutely different – and in such a way that for each the will of the other is

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