[p. 239]
|239| whole. This whole, closed within itself, is not a bond through a contract; about their property they do indeed both contract; but not about their body – Kant’s barbaric notion of wanting to cede to one another the sexual organs for use, and so the whole body too, as it were as an extra; – thus they could be forced together by soldiers. – a) that relatives who are too close do not marry is the positive law about marriage; – opposed to the concept of love. Independent, naturally free persons, not posited in immediate being-recognised, are to find one another; relatives are the same blood, the same being-recognised. – Even in this degree of kinship indeterminacy already begins, but still more with regard to the other aspects, b) consent of both persons. For the law marriage is, in so far as both are persons, will; the consent of both parties, – whether they want to marry, whether they will this whole that is called marriage, thus in general, – not in detail, as in the contract; – and since each at the same time counts not as a singular but as a member of the family, whether the family of both consents. – Marriage [is] precisely this mixing of personality, and impersonality of the natural – this the divine – as a natural that is spiritual in this naturalness, does not merely determine the will; hence [it is] a religious act; but for the sake of the will, a civil one, which belongs before the law; – both come together, as also in the consent the persons and the families. – The law is as the pure will, freedom from singularity; both of the persons, of their natural character,109) – and of the particular moments into which marriage analyses itself. – This free vitality and the pure law are in interplay with one another; the pure willing is the result of the living movement, and this has that abstraction, pure thinking, for its being – and solely on the side of the pure willing – of the
109) In the margin: Law is no compulsion to marriage
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