[p. 230]
|230| This is one sense; but the reverse is the essentiality of existence as such, and indeed against the essentiality of the will as such, against the singular will; existence, which has the significance of the common will, against the singularity of the will; and it is rather this that is to be upheld against the latter.93) This upholding is the sublating of that existence, coercion; the other must perform; his will, although it is will, is not respected, because it is opposed to itself as common will. – My singular will is essential, but at the same time only a moment; – and in my having posited it as common, I have posited [myself] as common [will]; my word must count; not for moral reasons, that I ought to remain inwardly equal to myself, not change my disposition, conviction and so on; rather I can change this; but my will is there only as recognised; I contradict not only myself but the fact that my will is recognised; one cannot rely on my word, i.e. my will is merely mine, mere opinion. The person, pure being-for-itself, is therefore respected not as singular will separating itself from the common will, but only as common will; – I am coerced to be a person.
93) In the margin: because he himself posited himself as such a one to whom his actual existence is indifferent; holds him to it –
The94) contract contains α) the determinate, particular will as a universal one β) its content, the thing which is the middle of the relation, is therefore a particular thing, a particular existence, from which I can abstract; – my contingent will concerns something contingent; as in exchange, the existing, which belongs to the middle, is a particular, and I step forward as particular will against the other
94) In the margin: But this holding-to is one-sided – contradiction of property; I am person, existence is indifferent to me – and I lay my personality into my existence
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