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On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 448]

|448| something formal, hovering only above the plurality, not penetrating it. Be it that God is cognised not only as founder of the union but also as its preserver, and, in relation to the latter, the majesty of the supreme power as his reflection and divine in itself, the divine of the union is something external for the united many, who must be posited with it only in the relation of dominion, because the principle of this empiricism excludes the absolute unity of the one and the many; at which point of this relation it coincides immediately with the opposed principle, for which abstract unity is the first, except that empiricism is not embarrassed by its inconsistencies, which spring from the mixing of things posited as so specifically different as abstract unity and absolute plurality are, and for this very reason also has the advantage of not closing the access to views which, apart from their merely material side, are appearances of a purer and more divine interior than can come about according to the principle of opposition, in which alone ruling and obeying are possible.

The state of nature and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right, alien to the individuals and therefore itself individual and particular, as well as the relation of the absolute subjection of the subjects under that supreme power, are the forms in which the splintered moments of organic ethical life – the moment of absolute unity and of the same insofar as it comprehends within itself the opposition of unity and plurality and is absolute totality, and the moment of infinity or of the nothing of the realities of the opposition – are fixed as particular essentialities and precisely thereby, as is the Idea, are perverted. The absolute Idea of ethical life, on the other hand, contains the natural condition and the majesty as absolutely identical, in that the latter itself is nothing other than the absolute ethical nature, and no loss of absolute freedom, which one would have to

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One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

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    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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