sary. Because the real subsists within it, its identity is a relative one, and this relative identity of what is opposed is necessity; thus, just as it is within difference, so too must its relation itself, or the identity of the relation, be a different one — such that in it, either unity or multiplicity is the first term; this twofold relation determines the doubled side of necessity, or of the appearance of the Absolute. Since this twofold relation falls upon multiplicity, and if we call the unity of what is different — which stands on the other side, and in which that reality, or the many, is sublated — indifference, then the Absolute is the unity of indifference and relation; and because this is a doubled unity, the appearance of the Absolute is determined as the unity of indifference and of that relation, or that relative identity, in which the many is the first, the positive term — and as the unity of indifference and of that relation in which unity is the first and positive term; the former is physical nature, the latter ethical nature. And since indifference, or unity, is freedom, while relation, or relative identity, is necessity, each of these two appearances is the being-one and the indifference of freedom and necessity. Substance is absolute and infinite; in this predicate, infinity, lies the necessity of the divine nature, or its appearance, and this necessity expresses itself as reality precisely in a doubled relation; each of the two attributes itself expresses substance, and is absolute and infinite, or the unity of indifference and relation; and in the relation their difference is posited such that in the relation of the one, the many is the first term, while in the relation of the other, the one is the first term, or that which is turned outward against the others. But because in ethical nature itself, in its relation, unity is the first term, it is therefore also free within this relative identity, that is, within its necessity; or, because the relative identity is not sublated by unity being the first term, this second freedom is determined such that the necessary does exist for ethical nature, but is posited negatively. Were we now to isolate this side of the relative identity of ethical nature, and not to recognize the absolute unity of indifference and this relative identity as the essence of ethical nature, but rather the side of relation, or necessity, then we would stand at the very same point at which the essence of practical reason is determined as possessing absolute causality — that is, that it is indeed free, and necessity is posited only negatively, yet is for that very reason still posited, whereby that very freedom fails to emerge from difference, the relation or relative identity is made into the essence, and the Absolute is conceived solely as the negatively Absolute, or as infinity.

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