On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

and to compel one another. But if, in this way, action and reaction, stand and resistance, are equally strong, then the power on both sides is reduced to equilibrium, and thereby all activity, expression of will, and acting are sublated; whether the reduction is thought of positively or negatively—whether action and reaction are thought of as existing and effective, or whether they are posited negatively, the equilibrium consisting in there being as little acting as reacting present. Wanting to remedy this death by extending the immediate standing-opposed into a circle of effects, so that the midpoint of contact—the point at which the reduction of the opposed terms appears—is apparently sublated by the deceptive leaving-empty of this midpoint, is likewise no true way out. Against the hierarchy of coercion descending, through its ramifications, from the supreme power down to every particular, there is supposed to rise up, from these particulars, an equal and opposite pyramid, ascending to a supreme apex of counter-pressure against the descending one, so that the whole curves round into a circle, in which the immediacy of contact would vanish, the forces, insofar as they form a mass, would be kept apart, and, through intermediate links, that artificial difference would be produced, so that no link would react immediately upon that by which it is moved (which is what produces the reduction to equilibrium), but always upon something other than that by which it is moved, so that the first would move the last, and this last would in turn move that first. But such a perpetuum mobile, whose parts are all supposed to move round in a series, instead of moving, sets itself at once into perfect equilibrium, and becomes a perfect perpetuum quietum; for pressure and counter-pressure, compelling and being compelled, are perfectly equal to one another, and stand just as immediately opposed to one another, and bring about precisely the same reduction of forces as in the first conception; pure quantity is not to be deceived by such a mediation, through which no difference, or true infinity and form, is in any way brought into it, but it remains, as before, a wholly undivided, pure, shapeless power. In this way, no coercion is possible against the power, to make it conform to the concept of universal freedom, for no force is to be found outside it, and no separation can be posited within it itself.

For this reason, refuge is then taken in an entirely formal distinction: actual power is indeed posited as one and united in the government; but what is set over against it is possible power, and this possibility, as such, is supposed to be capable of compelling that actuality. To this second, powerless existence of the common will, namely, is supposed to belong the judgment as to whether the power has abandoned the former, with which it is bound up, whether the

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  1. Editorial Note Avatar
    Editorial Note

    Editorial Note:

    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    • p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    • p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    • p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    • p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    • p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    • p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    • p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    • p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    • p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    • p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    • p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

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