grundlinien.de

On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right

[p. 514]

|514| deter from it from the side of the law, is something psychological, namely something inner, thereby it is immediately posited in freedom, which could abstract from it or not, and the one as much as the other is freedom of the will. If, however, it is objected that one does opine, and that it is a general mode of representation, that a coercion, and a psychological one, takes place, then this is in the first place not true, but it is just as well, and without doubt more generally, opined that an action or the omission of an action comes from free will, and then one would have as little to concern oneself with opining in setting up principles and determining laws as astronomers allow themselves, in the cognition of the laws of the heavens, to be detained by the opinion that the sun and the planets and all the stars move around the earth, are just as large as they appear, etc.; as little as the ship’s master concerns himself with the opinion that the ship is at rest and the shores move away. If both held to the opinion, the former would find it impossible to comprehend the solar system, and the latter would have the rowers stop their work or take in the sails, and both would at once find themselves in the impossibility of attaining their purpose and become immediately aware of the non-reality of the opinion as soon as they wanted to concede reality to it, – as has been shown above that coercion, thought as reality, i.e. represented in a system and in totality, immediately sublates itself and the whole.

Since thus a determinacy which is held fast by the opining of positive science is the very contrary of itself, it is equally possible for the two parties, each of which holds to one of the opposed determinacies, to refute the other, which possibility of refuting consists in this, that of each determinacy it is shown that it is not at all thinkable and nothing at all without relation to the one opposed to it; but because it only is and only has meaning in relation to this,

Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

DE

Comments

One response to “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right”

  1. Cross-reference Avatar
    Cross-reference

    Cross-reference:
    The following passages of this essay anticipate ideas that Hegel later developed at greater length in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Each link leads directly to the exact passage within this essay:

    p. 427 f. (part 2, 1802) – “The state of nature, and the majesty and divinity of the whole of the condition of right …” → § 258 (on the relation between the state of nature, contract theory, and the state’s ethical substantiality)
    p. 437 (part 2, 1802) – “If the determinacy of property in general is posited, then the tautological proposition …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of property))
    p. 439 (part 2, 1802) – “A maxim that, on this principle, is immoral because it contradicts itself, is, precisely …” → § 135 (on the critique of the empty formalism of the Kantian doctrine of duty (the example of helping the poor))
    p. 449 (part 2, 1802) – “In this its determination, then, punishment is something in itself, truly infinite and …” → § 99 (on the theory of punishment: punishment as a work of freedom, against the mere idea of coercion or deterrence)
    p. 458 (part 2, 1802) – “They received laws and commanders from the will of their monarch, and the descendants of …” → § 357 (on the Roman Empire as the disintegration of ethical life into private personhood and abstract universality)
    p. 459 (part 2, 1802) – “It is this nothing other than the performance of tragedy within the ethical, which the …” → § 324 (on the ethical moment of sacrifice and the transience of the finite (compare the motif of war))
    p. 464 (part 2, 1802) – “But that which we have set on one side under the outer form of the first estate is the …” → § 325 (on the estate of valor of its own, and the free, violent death as the highest abstraction of freedom)
    p. 469 (part 3, 1803) – “There must also be a reflex of the same in his empirical consciousness, and such a reflex …” → § 204 (on the second estate (possession, property, bourgeois/formal ethical life))
    p. 469 f. (part 3, 1803) – “Those properties, however, that are truly ethical, in that in them the particular or …” → § 150 (on virtue as ethical energy become individual (the examples of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar))
    p. 470 (part 3, 1803) – “It must also present itself in the form of universality and of cognition, as a system of …” → § 274 (on the relation between legislation and the living customs of a people)
    p. 471 (part 3, 1803) – “We remark in advance, in general, that philosophy, through the universality of the …” → § 3 (on the boundary between philosophical and positive (historical) legal science)

Leave a Reply